What UpGuard found
On October 14, 2026, UpGuard published a scan of about 300,000 domains showing Supabase indicators. Result: 16,326 databases with tables anyone could read, more than half with signs of personal data. A smaller share held passwords or authentication tokens.
The key they used to read was in the sites' own public JavaScript. That key is meant to live in the browser. The problem is what it can read when the database has no Row Level Security (RLS).
Why this hits AI builders
According to UpGuard, tables created in the Supabase dashboard editor start with RLS on. Tables created through the API, the path coding agents usually take, do not. The founder asks for "an orders table", the agent creates it through the API, the app works, and the table stays open.
Check yours now
- In the Supabase dashboard, open Security Advisor. It flags tables without RLS.
- For every table with customer data, confirm RLS is on and the policy is not
USING (true). RLS with that policy passes "has RLS" and protects nothing. - Test with two test accounts of your own: account A must not read account B's record with the public key.
- Confirm the
service_rolekey never appears in client code. It bypasses every policy. - Every time the agent creates a new table, repeat step 1.
Ask the agent the right way
`text
List every Supabase table in my own project and, for each one, show whether RLS is enabled and the exact policy text.
Flag tables with personal data that have RLS off or a USING (true) policy.
Quote the migration file and line for each finding. Do not change anything in this pass.
`
The RET Promptbook ships a ready skill for tenant isolation that runs this check and proposes the failing test before the fix.
Sources
- UpGuard, "Everything Everywhere: Systemic Data Exposure in Supabase Apps", 2026-10-14
- TechCrunch, 2026-09-25 coverage of Supabase customers exposing data
- Supabase Security Advisor documentation
